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Abstract 
 
Scottish attempts at financial innovation in the late seventeenth century included the 
Bank of Scotland and the Darien Scheme. The Bank is still in existence, but the Darien 
scheme’s mission to site a Scottish colony on the isthmus of Darien, Panama, was a 
disaster. It has often been cited as one of the key reasons for the Union between Scotland 
and England in 1707, due to its devastating effects on the Scottish economy. Like the 
South Sea Bubble, the Darien scheme has been thought about in broad terms rather than 
being considered as an attempt to introduce financial innovation into a mercantilist world. 
The contemporary pamphlet literature is a record of the public debates of the period. The 
Scottish pamphlets which are in favour of the scheme largely advertise it as an important 
element in Scotland’s continued survival as an independent state. After its failure, 
pamphleteers were quick to print Anglophobic tracts claiming an English plot to destroy 
Scotland’s independence. This paper attempts to reconsider the debate. It shows that 
arguments against the scheme were often as faulty as those in favour of it. Indeed, many 
of the complaints were waged against the idea of joint-stock companies as being 
inherently likely to fail or as being in some way immoral. Similar complaints appeared 
against other joint-stock companies of the period, including the South Sea Company. One 
of the founders of the Bank of England, William Paterson, was behind the Darien 
scheme. His original intention was for a British, rather than purely Scottish, undertaking.  
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Anglophobia, Religion 
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The Darien Scheme was an attempt to plant a Scottish colony on the Isthmus of Panama 
at Darien.
2 The Company of Scotland trading to Africa and the Indies, popularly known 
as the Darien Company, was set up by William Paterson in 1695 and two expeditions 
were sent out in 1698 and 1699. Both left Darien and lives and capital were lost. The 
collapse of the scheme was widely thought to have been the final blow to the Scottish 
economy  and  therefore  Scottish  independence.  The  Act  of  Union  followed  in  1707. 
Traditionally, the scheme has been viewed as last attempt for an independent Scotland to 
compete economically with its neighbours. The English have been blamed for some part 
in its failure as the English Parliament blocked the subscription issue in London and also 
in Hamburg. Later, English colonies were forbidden to assist the Scots, whilst at Darien 
and even after they had left the colony and sought refuge. This paper uses the pamphlet 
literature to  consider  contemporary views of the Darien scheme.  It separates the two 
issues of Darien and the Act of Union and considers the complex web of loyalties to 
religion, nation and monarch which formed the backdrop to the affair. The Scots’ faith in 
God and King William underpinned their belief in Darien. However, the contemporary 
sources  of  information  regarding  Darien  were  surprisingly  accurate  in  many  ways. 
However,  the  pamphlet  literature,  and  later  the  secondary  literature’s,  discussions  of 
ownership and power in Panama obscure the realities of indigenous control in the region. 
Therefore, the representations of the main indigenous group in Darien, the Kuna, and of 
Panama itself are distorted. The paper also considers the way in which the Darien scheme 
has been portrayed subsequently in the secondary literature. Historians tend to place the 
scheme within a framework of European national competition and development. They 
portray  it  as  being  bound  to  fail  and  a  straightforward  disaster  story.  However,  the 
settlers’ difficulties sprung from a variety of different sources, some unpredictable and 
outside human agency.  
 
The Darien Company is usually mentioned as one of the factors leading to the Act of 
Union of 1707. Therefore, its history is somewhat overshadowed by the lasting political 
and social effects of the Union, and later arguments concerning the importance of 1707 to 
England, Scotland and the new political construct of Britain. The company’s own history 
has been written several times, but the key reference works are those of George Pratt Insh 
and John Prebble.
3 Their detailed discussions of the various stages in the company’s life 
are useful, but of their time. Their scholarship, and that of subsequent writers, tends to 
consider Darien as an obviously unworkable scheme. Three main reasons are usually 
cited. Firstly, Darien was considered as the property of the Spanish Empire. Secondly, 
Scotland was underdeveloped in terms of its European neighbours and thus could not 
compete in a mercantilist world. Thirdly, the organisation and the management of the 
scheme, including the choice of Darien, were faulty. By framing the Darien scheme as a 
disaster  story,  the  multiplicity  of  decisions  and  events  are  simplified  into  a  linear 
narrative. The simplified tale serves two main purposes. One is as a footnote in another 
historical narrative, say that of the Union or Scotland itself. The other is the provision of 
a classic tale of disaster which might act as a warning against folly or ambition. In this 
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sense, the story of Darien as disaster fulfils the same purposes as framing the South Sea 
Bubble of 1720 as an incidence of gambling mania and fraud. The disaster story can also 
fit into a series of Scottish tragedy narratives such as the romantic retellings of the life of 
Mary, Queen of Scots, or the ‘Forty-Five. The simplifications of the Darien disaster story 
avoid  the  discussion  of  potentially  positive  outcomes  and  tend  to  obscure  the 
contemporary views of the projects. Therefore, our ancestors appear as merely naïve, 
greedy or just simply less developed than we are.  
 
Walker argued that modernisation theory underpins much historical writing, whether or 
not the  writers are  aware of  it  themselves.  ‘Ideas  about  modernization  are  so  deeply 
rooted in western culture that they appear to be common sense: “obviously” the world has 
modernized; “obviously” some societies are more modern than others. Not surprisingly, 
many historians have assumed that the process began in the early modern period and that 
that period is defined by a conflict between traditional and modern.’
4 The Darien scheme 
is usually considered as a belated attempt by Scotland to catch up with the activities of 
the English joint-stock companies. It was then at the mercy of an even more advanced 
Spanish empire, and the assistance it received from the Kuna is of little note, or merely 
pathetically touching. This approach places the Scots in a race for development, behind 
the English and Spanish, but ahead of the Kuna. It also downplays the role of other 
factors such as natural disasters, accidents and disease. 
 
The  Darien  scheme  was  seen  by  Insh  as  being  ill-timed  relative  to  other  European 
nations’ development. His pamphlet started with the words ‘the great movements in the 
History of Scotland have often been either late or premature; but always conceived in a 
spirit of high ambition and always entered upon in a spirit of passionate determination’.
5 
Lenman argued that due to mercantilism elsewhere, ‘Scotland faced a widespread policy 
of  beggar-my-neighbour  against  which  her  smallness  hardly  permitted  effective 
retaliation’.
6 These ideas of developmental stages which countries or peoples reach at 
different times distort our understanding of the power relations in the region. Due to ideas 
of relative development, it was seen as inconceivable that the Spanish would not settle in 
pleasant or useful areas. Kuna-held land is portrayed as being ‘pestilent and unhealthy’ 
and that is the only reason for a lack of a permanent or sizeable Spanish presence. The 
Kuna are therefore seen as being pushed into areas which the Spanish have rejected as 
hinterlands or swamp. Prebble argued that ‘the Directors of the Company did not ask 
themselves why, if Darien were such as paradise, Spain had not already settled there 
[?]’.
7 He portrayed the Spanish as the masters of Isthmus with garrisons, forts and towns 
and said that they were ‘wise enough, and had been in America long enough not to waste 
time and men on the swamps of Darien’.
8 The Kuna’s backwardness or pre-modernity is 
assumed throughout. Prebble portrayed the Kuna as a childish people. He wrote, ‘the 
round, bright-eyed faces of the Cunas peered at the Directors from the simple framework 
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Hodder Arnold, 2005), pp. 25-48 (p. 25). 
5 George Pratt Insh, The Darien Scheme (London: Historical Association, 1947), p. 3. 
6 Bruce Lenman, An Economic History of Modern Scotland, 1660-1976 (London: Batsford, 1977), p. 45. 
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of Wafer’s prose […] He respected their uncomplicated religion.’
9 Insh’s pamphlet of 
1947  does  not  mention  the  indigenous  inhabitants  at  all.  This  portrayal  of  European 
power ignores both the power of indigenous groups and the impact of natural phenomena 
upon  Europeans.  The  Spanish  were  often  weakened  by  epidemic  even  within  their 
garrisons  and  forts,  which  they  needed  as  defensive  structures  against  the  attacks  of 
indigenous groups and buccaneers. 
 
Darien is in modern day Panama, between Portobello and Cartagena in Columbia. It was 
on  the  fringes  of  what  the  early  modern  Spanish  settlers  called  New  Granada.  The 
weakness  of  Spain  under  the  last  of  the  Habsburg  kings  and  the  difficulties  of 
maintaining such a vast empire meant that this area was not subdued by the Spanish. This 
remained the case even into the nineteenth century. Helg wrote ‘in the west [of New 
Granada]  the  territory  was  almost  entirely  controlled  by  sovereign  Indians  […]  an 
estimated 10,000 Kuna (or Cuna) in the region of the Atrato River and in the Darién […] 
indigenous  defiance  of  Spain  […]  meant  that  this  region  tended  to  favour  Spain’s 
enemies and actively participated in contraband. This was particularly the case with the 
Kuna in the west and the  Wayúu in the east, both of whom had intense commercial 
relations with the British from Jamaica and the Dutch from Curaçao.’
10 Spanish attempts 
to settle the area failed. There were several thousand settlers scattered in small villages 
along the Isthmus in 1712, but their numbers had shrunk to 1,000 in less than 70 years. 
The  Kuna  started  to  attack  Spanish  settlements  in  the  province  of  Cartagena  itself. 
Further attempts to push into Kuna land in the 1770s were abandoned in the 1790s. There 
was no Spanish military presence between the south of the Sinú River and Portobello, 
including the Atrato River which was the primary means of access to the Chocó gold 
mines. Even by 1830, a Spanish Viceroy declared, with regard to the Kuna, that ‘their 
subjugation [was] an almost desperate matter’.
11 
 
This mosaic of European and indigenous power bases was more in line with the realities 
of  European  settlements  elsewhere  in  the  Americas.  The  Spanish  had  strongholds  in 
certain localities, such as Cartagena and Portobello and control tracts of the continent, as 
did the  French, English and Dutch. There were similarly tracts of land controlled by 
indigenous  groups.  In  addition,  colonisation  is  often  constructed  in  terms  of  outright 
control of regions. What the Scots were proposing could be considered as a trading post 
on the margins of indigenous land. This would be similar to the European activity on the 
West African coast. Europeans could have fortified enclaves by were clearly within the 
jurisdiction of indigenous groups.
12 This reframing of the Scots’ scheme allows the Kuna 
to be viewed as primary actors, just as African tribal groups were during the same period.   
 
Themes  of  relative  development  and  racial  supremacy  also  appear  in  the  pamphlet 
literature. Written by Europeans for a European (primarily Scottish or English) audience, 
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it addressed questions of legal ownership by European nations. The Scots were ordered to 
find some land which was ‘unsettled’ and left Crab Island when they found a Danish ship 
docked there.
13 The Danes were considered to have a claim to that land, but the Kuna 
were not considered to have a claim to Darien. This notion of settlement did not have any 
relation to the type of settlement, number of inhabitants or length of time they had been 
there.  Rather,  only  people  of  European  descent  could  claim  land  by  settlement.  The 
Spanish might claim the entire Americas due to their financing of Columbus’ expedition. 
However, other European nations clearly held colonies due to force majeure. The Spanish 
were obliged to acknowledge this fact as the anonymous author of Certain Propositions 
pointed  out.
14  This  writer  argued  that  the  Spanish  never  settled  at  Darien  and  that 
settlement must therefore grant right of ownership. These arguments implicitly assumed 
that the Spanish were powerful and that the Kuna were not. It also frames a debate in 
terms of settlement and colonisation rather than as the entrepôt which was Paterson’s 
original plan.  
 
Pamphlets also stressed Spanish oppression of indigenous peoples as being a reason for 
the Kuna’s friendliness to non-Spanish Europeans.
15 Pamphleteers discussed indigenous 
resistance or compliance, but not indigenous power. This reinforced ideas of Spanish 
power over the whole region.  When the Scots arrived at Darien, the Spanish did not 
attack immediately, and their attempts against the first expedition were not particularly 
impressive.  They  were  themselves  weakened  by  epidemics  and,  outside  of  their 
strongholds, were precariously settled. They were also hampered by the weakness of the 
chain of command starting in Madrid. The Spanish king’s illness and worries over the 
succession created problems. The Kuna and Scots co-operated in skirmishes against the 
Spanish and routed them at the Battle of Toubacanti.
16 The Scots’ real difficulties, whilst 
still at Darien, seemed to come from a lack of provisions and illness. Such difficulties 
might be expected in the initial phase of any settlement, but the embargo on trading with 
the English islands contributed to their distress. 
 
The pamphlet literature and the secondary sources diverge over the question of whether 
Darien was worth settling (by Europeans). Pamphlets supportive of the Darien scheme 
naturally  exaggerated the  charms  of  the  Darien  site.  A  pamphlet  credited  to  William 
Paterson himself claimed that ‘The Country is Healthful to a wonder; insomuch that our 
own Sick, which were many when we Arrived, are now generally cured’.
17 Other writers 
attempted to lend authenticity by created detailed fictions. For example, readers were 
informed  by  one  author  than  indigenous  women  carried  their  dead  husbands’  bones 
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around in a sack for an entire year.
18 Despite such fictions, a surprising amount of the 
information given in these pamphlets was borne out by events. The Kuna were indeed 
friendly to the Scots. The variety of wildlife and plant life was also notable. In these 
descriptions, the pamphlet literature was influenced by the published journal of Lionel 
Wafer. A former buccaneer, Wafer had written of his experiences when he stayed for two 
months with the Kuna at Darien.
19 His descriptions of the lush forest, variety of wildlife 
and the Kuna themselves were not disputed by the Scots who later settled at Darien. 
Wafer  met  the  directors  of  the  company  in  Edinburgh.
20  He  also  advised  the 
Commissioners for Trade and Plantations in London, accompanied by his old shipmate, 
Dampier.  The  English  even  considered  settling  the  place  themselves.
21  Its  strategic 
location on the Isthmus and links to gold-bearing areas were positive factors.  
 
The secondary literature tends to view the Darien site as unhealthy and discarded by the 
Spanish. (This idea has already been challenged earlier in the paper.) The motif of Darien 
as innately unhealthy is reused frequently. The lush vegetation and wildlife is portrayed 
as being supported by rotting and decaying matter and much is made of the high levels of 
rainfall.
22 The settlers’ illnesses and deaths are supposed to have been due to the choice 
of site.
23 However, the recorded deaths from fluxes and fevers do not give sufficient 
detail  to  analyse  whether  these  diseases  came  from  contact  with  indigenous  people, 
insects such as mosquitos or from local water sources. The settlers may have brought 
their illnesses with them. They had survived a long Atlantic journey and were likely to 
have been suffering from deficiencies in their diet. It is also not clear how robust they 
were to begin with, given Scotland’s poor harvests. 1200 men and some boys and women 
left with the first expedition. Four died at Madeira of ‘flux’. 36 died between Madeira 
and  Darien.  28  died  from  illness  and  four  were  drowned  during  the  two  months  at 
Darien.
24 By contemporary standards, especially of long sea crossings, these figures are 
low. The company printed the lists of deaths and the company secretary, Mackenzie, 
wrote ‘it is a great and general Mercy that of so many as went crowded in Five Ships, 
upon so long and tedious a voyage as they had, so few are dead’.
25 In fact, more deaths 
occurred when ships were lost in hurricanes or when the Scots abandoned Darien for the 
English colonies and were refused support.
26 Darien may have been no more ‘pestilential’ 
than  nearby  Carthagena  which  was  then  in  the  grip  of  epidemic.  It  should  also  be 
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remembered that Scotland itself can be described as inhospitable. Its poor harvests and 
cold and rainy climate also held problems for the Scots. However, Darien’s ‘pestilential’ 
nature is used as a metaphor for the folly of the whole scheme. The Scots’ behaviour 
needs to be discussed in context. They may have been escaping from famine, rather than 
to dreams of gold. They barely had time to recover from the Atlantic crossing and to gain 
food supplies which would allow them to truly settle the area, although some buildings 
and a fort were erected.  
 
The story of folly is elaborated in other ways in the secondary literature. Prebble argued 
that  the trade  goods  were  ill-chosen,  particularly  with  reference  to  Wafer’s  warnings 
about the heavy rainfall in Darien.
27 A contemporary, Walter Herries, had claimed that 
the  company  had  sent  ‘Scotch  hats,  a  great  quantity;  English  bibles,  1500;  periwigs, 
4000, some long, some short; campaigns, Spanish bobs and natural ones’. Prebble noted 
that the number was probably exaggerated, and they were probably for the settlers’ use 
rather than trade goods. He pointed out that Macauley had been caught out by Herries’ 
account. (Herries was a deserter from the first expedition and motivated to be critical of it 
to justify his own actions.)
28 The cargoes included a great many types of armaments and 
ammunition. They also included cloth, clothing, cooking utensils, crockery and tobacco 
pipes. After listing the cargoes’ contents in detail, Prebble began a new paragraph with 
the words ‘And combs.’ The Directors’ decision to order tens of thousands of combs was 
due to ‘Lionel Wafer’s idyllic picture of the Cuna Indians, combing long hair with their 
fingers’.
29  The  Kuna’s  nose  ornaments  or  choice  of  clothing  marked  them  as  less 
developed, whilst the Scots use of wigs, uniforms and badges marked them as being 
foolishly ill-adapted to their surroundings. At least, the directors saw the Kuna as worthy 
of consideration as trading partners. The bibles and wigs they bought for the settlers’ own 
use were essential items within their society, and would have appeared in other European 
settlements. The practice of emblazoning uniforms or other items with company arms 
was  also  a  contemporary  practice.  The  Royal  African  Company  even  had  a  chalice 
engraved with its arms.
30 
 
Similarly, the secondary literature stresses the consumption of alcohol as another sign of 
folly. This may reflect normative judgements regarding abstinence from alcohol. Barbour 
criticised the allowances of ‘strong liquors’ and wrote that it was ‘pleasing to note that 
Paterson  himself  was  an  abstainer’.
31  The  consumption  of  alcohol  should  again  be 
considered with regard to contemporary practice. It was one way in which waterborne 
diseases could be avoided. This was important prior to the public health initiatives which 
effectively wiped out typhoid and cholera in Britain.  In addition, contemporary notions 
of ‘strong’ liquor may not be comparable to modern spirits. However, if the settlers were 
indeed reliant on alcohol, they were less likely to be affected by the nature of the water 
supplies around Darien. This may be an example of prudence rather than self-indulgence.   
                                                 
27 Prebble, p. 77. 
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One point of interest is that the first settlers had no idea of the intended location of their 
settlement. The pamphlets were published after the first voyage had taken place, as its 
destination had been kept secret until the captains opened their orders at Madeira.
32 This 
was to prevent English intervention in the sailing of the fleet and to stop them claiming 
right  of  settlement  ahead  of  the  Scots.  Both  Pratt  Insh  and  Prebble  noted  that  the 
opposition of the English parliament tended to originate from concerns about the Darien 
Company’s  remit.  Its  original  name  implied  that  it  would  contest  the  monopolies  of 
English  joint-stock  companies,  such  as  the  East  India  Company.  ‘The  Company  is 
referred to sometimes as “our African Company”, sometimes as “our Indian Company”; 
by English politicians and merchants it is called significantly “The Scotch East India 
Company”; its official title was “The Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the 
Indies”.’
33  Therefore,  the  first  subscribers  and  the  first  colonists  were  investing  in  a 
company  whose  exact  nature  was  unknown  to  them.  This  makes  their  investment 
decision all the more remarkable. Between February and August 1696, nearly 1,500 Scots 
pledged £400,000 Sterling to the Darien Company. Jones argued that both the sum and 
the  speed  with  which  it  was  pledged  distinguish  the  Darien  scheme  from  its 
contemporaries.  When  this  is  set  against  the  backdrop  of  Scotland’s  domestic 
circumstances (blocks on trade, bad harvests and loss of men in war) then Jones found 
that  ‘the  Company’s  ambition  and  accomplishment  are  similarly  astounding’.
34  The 
settlers may have been motivated merely to escape unemployment and poor harvests. 
However,  the  investors  must  clearly  have  been  investing  out  of  surplus  funds.  Both 
investors and settlers would have also needed to be patient as such a venture would need 
time for long sea journey and for the colony to establish itself. Their motivations need to 
be considered further. 
 
Patriotism might be one reason to participate in a scheme which was supposed to promote 
Scotland’s  trade.  The  subscription  list  for  the  first  £400,000  was  printed  by  Andrew 
Anderson in Edinburgh in 1696.
35 Its frontispiece stated that it is a ‘Perfect List of the 
Several Persons Residenters in Scotland’. Not everyone resident in Scotland is a Scot. 
However, the importance of stating Scottish residence would be intended to encourage 
Scots patriots to invest. This should be seen as largely a marketing ploy in 1696, as the 
attempts  to  raise  money  on  the  English  and  continental  markets  followed.  Jones  has 
found evidence that William’s blocking tactics were not entirely effective. Scotland had 
had a run of poor harvests, necessitating the outflow of specie to pay for grain imports. 
The Bank of Scotland was also taking in subscriptions when the Darien Company was 
forced  out of  the  London  market  and wished  to raise  capital  in  Edinburgh.  Yet,  this 
squeeze on liquid assets did not result in higher interest rates. Therefore, Jones argues, 
that  there  must  have  been  a  flow  of  funds  from  abroad.  Furthermore,  he  notes  that 
William could stop the company from setting up books in London but could not stop 
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investors  sending  their  money  northwards.
36  As  a  patriotic  investment,  it  might  be 
supposed to attract money from the Scots Diaspora. 
 
One  of  Jones’  arguments  is  that  the  support  of  the  elite  signalled  to  other  potential 
investors that the scheme had high-level support. ‘Perhaps more than William Paterson’s 
genius or credibility, it was the overwhelming support of wealthy and influential Scots 
that spurred investor confidence’.
37 Jones noted that this conspicuous support would then 
mean that some Scottish noblemen would be obliged to make an investment in order to 
maintain  their  political  position.
38  Another  sub-group  of  investors  may  have  been 
motivated to invest for similarly self-promoting reasons. Jones argued that as 36 soldiers 
and sailors have their names in the subscription books, they were perhaps hoping for 
preferment to the colonies.
39 They make up only a small part of the issue and it may be 
that the Scots Diaspora was more important. However, if English and continental money 
was coming into Edinburgh then a purely patriotic explanation is not plausible. Perhaps, 
the blocking tactics of the East India Company merely served to publicise the issue and 
make it seem worth investing in. William’s objections relating to the scheme were not 
then truly apparent. 
 
William  had  stated  that  he  was  ‘ill-served  in  Scotland’.
40  In  1695,  The  Bill  for  the 
settlement of a Scottish plantation was overshadowed by the Inquiry into the Massacre of 
Glencoe.
41 The Act incorporating what was later known as the Darien Company received 
Royal Assent from Lord Tweeddale, not William himself. William was, as ever, engaged 
in war on the continent.
42 His remark, which seemed to refer to the Glencoe Inquiry, did 
not necessarily imply that he was hostile towards Scotland itself or towards the Darien 
Company.  (The  first  expedition  even  included  men  who  had  been  involved  in  the 
Glencoe massacre.
43)
 William had been supplied with money and men from Scotland for 
his wars. Scotland’s objections to English dominance did not imply a lack of loyalty to 
William. William’s role as a defender of Protestantism had turned many Scots from the 
male  Stuart  Kings,  even  though  they  were  of  Scottish  descent.  One  of  the  foremost 
opponents of the Union was Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun, called ‘The Patriot’. Yet he had 
been one of a number of political refugees who had clustered around William of Orange 
during the reign of James II. Fletcher returned from exile in William’s entourage.
44  
 
William’s obtuse and curt remarks gave no indication of his later actions. The English 
Parliament’s attempts to block subscriptions can be seen as a reaction to the wording of 
the company charter. William’s later decision to block aid to the settlers even after they 
had quit their colony is harder to explain. Insh quoted William’s words to the Scottish 
Parliament in 1700. William wrote, “It is truly our regrate that we could not agree to the 
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40 Prebble, pp. 48-49. 
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43 Prebble, p. 103. 
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asserting of the right of the companies colony in Darien and you may be very confident if 
it had not been for invincible reasons, the pressing desires of all our ministers with the 
inclination of our good subjects therein concerned had undoubtedly prevailed. But since 
we were and are fully satisfied that our yielding in that matter had infallibly disturbed the 
general peace of Christendom … and that now the state of the affaire is quite altered, we 
doubt not but you will rest satisfied with these plain reasons’.
45 Even if William wished 
to  reassure  Spain,  his  restrictions  seem  too  harsh.  Also,  it  is  not  clear  whether  the 
appeasement of the ailing Spanish king was ultimately that important. The War of the 
Spanish Succession was not averted by it.  
 
Perhaps  surprisingly,  given  his  subsequent  conduct,  contemporary  Scots  could  be 
strongly loyal to William III. Their devotion to the King of England did not preclude 
hatred of the English themselves. An example is the Darian Song pamphlet written by ‘a 
Lady of Honour’.
46 William is presented almost as if he is only King of Scotland and that 
England is an enemy both to him and to the Scottish nation.  
 
King WILLIAM did Encourage us,  
  against the English will. 
His Words is like a Statly Oak, 
  Will neither Bow nor Break; 
We’ll venture Life and Fortune both, 
  For Scotland and his sake  
 
The  obstacles  put  in  the  way  of  gathering  subscriptions  from  shareholders  were 
considered  to  be  the  fault  of  the  English  rather  than  of  the  King.  Andrew  Fletcher 
described  the  company’s  attempts  to  raise  money  in  London  being  thwarted  by  ‘the 
Measures  taken  in  the  Parliament  of  England’.  He  then  went  on  to  describe  the 
company’s  subscription  in  Hamburg  being  similarly  undermined,  writing  that  ‘the 
English Ministers there, did, under Pretence of a special Warrant from His Majesty, put a 
Stop  thereunto  […]’  The  King  himself  was  described  as  showing  his  favour  to  the 
scheme.
47 This faith was to go unrewarded. Later pamphlets considered William’s dual 
roles  as  King  of  England  and  King  of  Scotland  to  analyse  whether  his  actions  were 
legitimate in denying aid to the colonists.
48 
 
William’s role as a defender of the Protestant faith made his behaviour harder to justify. 
Some believed that success of the venture was assured if God was with the colonists. The 
dour letter of support from the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland makes that 
clear. 
  
                                                 
45 Quoted in Insh, Darien Scheme, p. 20. 
46 Lady of honour, The golden island, or, the Darian song in commendation in all concerned in that noble 
enterprize of the valiant Scots (London: John Reid, 1699). 
47 Andrew Fletcher, A short and impartial view of the manner and occasion of the Scots colony’s coming 
away from Darien (Edinburgh, 1699). 
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‘…The Lord is with You, while You are with him; and if you seek Him, he will 
be found of  you: But if you forsake Him, He will forsake you: and all your 
foreward Expectations and Blooming hopes shall be Blasted and Wither, and you 
Colony  laid  Desolate,  your  Names, instead  of  Honour  and  Renown,  shall  be 
branded with Infamy, Hissing and Scorn, and your Blessings turn’d unto Curses, 
and the Lord shall Pluck you up, and not Plant you, and shall separate you unto 
Evil, after he had said, he would do you Good.’ 
 
It is easy to forget that for many Scots hellfire was real and spiritual gains were far more 
important than material ones. The pamphlet exhorted the colonists to ‘[…]consider with 
Astonishment, with Gratitude, with relenting Sorrow and Shame, how many hundred of 
Leagues they have been carried safe, through the Vast Abyss, when there was but the 
thickness of a Plank betwixt them and Death, and consequently between them and Hell 
[….]’. Stressed throughout is the importance of a scheme which promoted the Protestant 
religion and recommended actual fighting as well as a moral fight against Catholicism. It 
argued that ‘[…] the most eminent of Saints, Recorded in the Holy Scriptures, have been 
most Couragious Warriours, and the best of Souldiers.’  
 
Even after all their trials, the members of the expeditions were vilified for their desertion 
of the colony. A letter from the Directors called the departure from Darien of the first 
expedition, ‘a shameful and dishonourable abandonment’.
49 Alexander Stobo, a minister, 
wrote of his fellow colonists, ‘they were ripe, they must be cut down by the sickle of His 
wrath’.
50   If it was believed to be God’s judgement upon them, then their own sin, rather 
than illness and hurricanes, were the ultimate cause. This idea of human weakness has 
changed from sin to folly in subsequent histories. However, the common thread of human 
agency over a variety of different circumstances remains. The religious faith with which 
groups explained their  world or helped to support their actions is often dismissed as 
irrational  or  irrelevant.  Again,  theories  of  modernisation  posit  a  world  which  is 
increasingly secular and in which superstitions are placed contrary to rationality. The 
themes of rationality and folly appear repeatedly in such disaster stories as the Darien and 
the  South  Sea.  The  decision  of  investors  to  put  their  trust  in  the  company,  without 
knowing the nature of the resulting settlement may appear naïve. It may be considered to 
be blind patriotism. However, it may be that religious motivations and faith in God’s 
mercy had more of a role than has been previously understood. The bibles which the 
settlers  took  with  them  were  not  redundant  trade  goods.  Their  presence  onboard 
necessitated the sacrifice of other supplies, including food and water. 
 
The Scottish General Assembly was consumed by the crusade against Catholic Spain, but 
there was also a strong current of Anglophobia in Scotland which set Protestant England 
up as an enemy. This sentiment was reciprocated, partly due to national tensions and 
partly due to factions within Protestantism itself. These ideas were reinforced by one 
another as Presbyterians held sway in Scotland and Episcopalians in England. The author 
of ‘Caledonia, or, The pedlar turn’d merchant’ accused the entire Scots nation of being 
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dishonest.  This  dishonesty  was  clearly  linked  to  attacks  on  Scottish  Presbyterianism. 
William Paterson was cast in the role of Scots preacher. 
 
‘This Paterson saw, their Pastor and Guide, 
  Who resolve’d such a Frollick had seiz’d ‘em; 
And flinging his Texts, and his Sermons aside,  
  Left his Flocks to be damn’d if it pleas’d em.’ 
 
One line of Caledonia considered that Paterson was planning ‘The Deceivers to Cheat 
and Deceive.’
51 However, the rhetoric of folly and fraud was often levelled at financial 
market  undertakings  in  the  early  modern  period.  Pamphleteers  applied  the  same 
criticisms  to  other  joint-stock  ventures  and  to  a  range  of  stock-jobbing  activity.
52 
Macauley wrote that Paterson was not ‘a mere visionary or a mere swindler’.
53 In reality, 
Paterson was a founder of the Bank of England and had even gone out to the colony to 
make a new life there. Paterson was also in favour of the political union of England and 
Scotland, and had been influential in London. Daniel Defoe owed his release from a 
debtors’ prison in London to the intervention of William Paterson.
54 
  
The events of the Union tended to crystallise the Darien scheme as a story of the Scots 
against the English. Economic distress was not the sole factor behind the decision of the 
Scottish  Parliament  to  vote  itself  out  of  existence.  Scott  argued  that  the  theory  that 
Scotland had joined the Union in order to gain access to a wider market was constructed 
c. 1850. He argued that it was the implicit threat of invasion from England and bribery 
which were the real causes. Scotland was granted the ‘Equivalent’ which was a sum of 
money of just over £39,000 to compensate it for taking on a share of the English National 
Debt and to compensate Darien shareholders with interest. This sum was to be paid out of 
customs and duties on Scottish trade to England.
55 Leading Jacobite, Lockhart, noted that 
the Equivalent was basically a bribe to some out of Scottish monies. ‘Was there any 
reparation made for the barbarous treatment Scotland received from her neighbours of 
England and the ruin of her colony of which they were the principal cause’.
56 It may be 
that  England  has  been  blamed  for  this,  but  England  itself  was  only  a  pawn  in  a 
Dutchman’s wars against Louis XIV. The English East India Company had been alarmed 
by incursions into its monopoly, but the Scots had chosen an area unclaimed by any 
English Company.  
 
A curious melding of Scottish nationalism and British identity occurred in Georgia in 
North America. The strategic location of the Altamaha Bluff was protected by Fort King 
George which was later abandoned. It was then decided by the British that it should be 
resettled and Highland soldiers were mooted as ideal settlers, due to their hardiness. The 
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recruits  were then  allowed  to  name  the settlement,  which  they  ‘desired’ to  be called 
Darien.
57 The British authorities appear to have allowed this. Presumably they saw no 
implied  reproach  or  slur  to  the  name  of  King  William.  It  is  curious  that  when 
apportioning blame, the Scots tended to choose the English rather than William. Perhaps, 
this was initially to protect themselves from accusations of Jacobite sympathies or was 
part of an existing Anglophobic stance. It may also be that English bribes over the Union 
have led to impression that Darien was deliberately sabotaged as part of a plot to weaken 
Scotland. Again, this is a version of the disaster story which also gives a great deal of 
power to human agents. The importance of a range of factors, from hurricanes to the 
Kuna, is again disregarded. It is tempting to wonder what would have happened to the 
colony if they had managed to outlast William, who died in 1702. Furthermore, it is 
interesting to wonder if the War of the Spanish Succession would also have favoured the 
colony’s survival as Spanish ships and men were required elsewhere. 
 
Sectarianism within the Protestant church itself and anti-Scots sentiment tend to have 
subsided in modern Britain. In Scotland, sectarianism between Catholic and Protestant 
and also Anglophobia remain very much alive. The survival of one set of prejudices and 
the decline of another obscures contemporary views of the Darien scheme. They can be 
partially reconstructed from the pamphlet literature of the period. Scots tended to view 
the Darien colony not only as an attempt to maintain Scotland’s economic independence, 
but  also  as  part  of  a  wider  Protestant  struggle.  Indeed,  King  William’s  status  as  a 
defender  of  Protestantism  had  won  the  loyalty  of  many  Scots  away  from  the  male 
Catholic  Stuart  line.  The  Presbyterians  were  unable  to  predict  that  William  would 
undermine the colony’s chances. Their Anglophobia meant that they blamed the English 
Parliament for setbacks rather than William. The Scots could have positioned themselves 
as middlemen acting as agents for the Kuna, who were the real power in the Darien 
region.  Discussions  of  European  charter  or  ownership  ignore  the  Kuna.  Later 
modernisation theories of development similarly sideline them. Such theories are also 
deterministic regarding the inevitable failure of the company. Therefore, the variety of 
different  possible  outcomes  and  factors  are  simplified  so  that  the  history  becomes  a 
disaster tale. It is repeated as a caution or appears as a footnote in histories of the Union.  
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